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NINTH CIRCUIT MUDDIES THE WATERS OF
TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE
CLEAN WATER ACT IN DESCHUTES RIVER
ALLIANCE V. PORTLAND GE
Danielle Clifford*
12 WASH. J. SOC. & ENV T. JUSTICE 45 (2022)
ABSTRACT
Throughout 2011 and 2012, members of the Deschutes River
community who fish in the Lower Deschutes River in Oregon noticed a
slew of significant changes to their natural environment. The Deschutes
River Alliance attributed the changes to the operation of the Pelton
Round Butte Hydraulic Project, which is co-owned and operated by
Portland General Electric and The Confederated Tribes of the Warm
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Springs. In July 2016, DRA filed a Clean Water Act lawsuit against
them.
To rule on the alleged CWA violations, the DRA must first get past
the tribal sovereign immunity hurdle. It is long-recognized that American
Indian Nations possess sovereign immunity, however, Congress may
expressly abrogate immunity or immunity may be waived. The
groundbreaking opinion in Deschutes River Alliance v. Portland Gen.
Elec. Co. represents the first time a court has held Congress did not
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity under the CWA. Despite decisions
from sister circuits, the court dismissed the suit before deciding whether
a CWA violation occurred. The Ninth Circuit decided to tread lightly to
projects on tribal land to pollute the water with no repercussions.
I.
THERE MUST BE SOMETHING IN THE WATER: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE DESCHUTES RIVER ALLIANCE AND
TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Throughout 2011 and 2012 members of the Deschutes River
community who fish in the Lower Deschutes River noticed a slew of
significant changes to their natural environment.1 Insect emergences
decreased.2 The water became cloudy, and fish migration patterns
changed.3 New algae appeared, and the bird population diminished.4
These environmental changes puzzled and concerned the community.5
In 2014, the Deschutes River community formed the Deschutes
River Alliance (DRA) and embarked on an in-depth research study to
better understand the water quality and other issues impacting the future
of the river and the communities it supports.6 DRA attributed the
decreased water quality of the Lower Deschutes River to the operation of
the Pelton Round Butte Hydraulic Project (Pelton Project).7 The Pelton

1

Greg McMillan, Our History, DESCHUTES RIVER ALL., https://deschutesriver
alliance.org/our-history (last visited Oct. 12, 2021) (describing history of DRA).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6
Id. (explaining approach of DRA).
7 DESCHUTES RIVER ALL., 2020 LOWER DESCHUTES RIVER WATER QUALITY REPORT 3-4
(June 2021), available at https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58c778d4414fb5205e
205605/t/610c5538692c9319cd142d53/1628198206212/2020_LDR_Final.pdf (noting
cause of water quality changes).
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Project is co-owned and operated by Portland General Electric (PGE)
and The Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs (Tribe).8
In July 2016, amidst failed attempts to negotiate with PGE and the
Tribe, DRA had no choice but to file a Clean Water Act (CWA) lawsuit
against them.9
10
the chem
For the court to rule on the alleged CWA violations, the plaintiff DRA
must first get past the tribal sovereign immunity hurdle.11 To make a
determination on sovereign immunity, the court must weigh the
against respecting tribal
sovereignty and congressional intent.12
13

The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the government and any
entity federally recognized as a state from nonconsensual suit. 14 It is
long-recognized that American Indian nation-tribes are granted sovereign
im
15
Certain circumstances, however, may abrogate that
16
immunity. For instance, Congress may expressly abrogate immunity or
immunity may be waived.17
The groundbreaking opinion in Deschutes River Alliance v. Portland
GE represents the first time a court held Congress did not abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity under the CWA.18 In reaching this decision, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the
reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
8

Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1174 (D. Or.
2018) (identifying defendant).
9 Id. (explaining why DRA filed suit); McMillan, supra note 1 (citing failed negotiation
attempts).
10
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
11
See generally Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153, 1159 (9th
Cir. 2021) (analyzing whether tribal sovereign immunity is abrogated by CWA).
12 Id. at 1159-60 (discussing whether CWA abrogates tribal sovereign immunity).
13 Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental
Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 Tulsa L. Rev. 661, 661, 663 (2002).
14 Id. at 662 (explaining protection provided by sovereign immunity).
15 Id. at 662-63 (recognizing that federal law allows tribes to be recognized as states
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity).
16 Id. at 663 (recognizing exceptions to sovereign immunity).
17
Id. at 662 n.7 (exemplifying instances of abrogation).
18 Michael Campbell & Beth Ginsberg, Ninth Circuit Finds No Sovereign Immunity
Waiver for Tribes Under CWA, JD SUPRA, (June 24, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/ninth-circuit-finds-no-sovereigndecision).
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and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit by applying
the rules of statutory interpretation to the CWA differently than the other
two Circuit Courts had applied the rules to other environmental
statutes.19 Despite these decisions from sister circuits, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned Deschutes River Alliance warranted dismissal because the court
sovereign immunity.20 The court dismissed the suit before deciding
whether a CWA violation occurred.21
highlights the tension between the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
the fundamental purpose of the CWA. The Ninth Circuit decided to tread
lightly to respect both the principle of tribal sovereign immunity and
pass for projects on tribal land to pollute the water with no repercussions.
This Note examines the Ninth Circui
Deschutes River
Alliance, beginning with a discussion of the facts in Part II. 22 Part III
details the legal background surrounding Deschutes River Alliance,
including a discussion of the CWA and decisions from the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits on abrogating tribal sovereign immunity.23 Part IV
of sister circuits.24 Finally, because of the potential for attention from the
United States Supreme Court, Part VI discusses the impact of Deschutes
River Alliance on the CWA and tribal sovereign immunity.25
II.

GETTING YOUR FEET WET: FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF
DESCHUTES WATER ALLIANCE

The Pelton Project is on the Deschutes River situated within and
adjacent to the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation

19

See id. (discussing the
Id.
21 Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2021).
22 For a further discussion of the facts in Deschutes River All., see infra notes 25-53 and
accompanying text.
20

23

Deschutes River All., see infra notes 54-110 and accompanying text; for a further
Deschutes River Alliance, see infra 11156 and accompanying text.
24
Deschutes River Alliance, see
infra notes 157-92 and accompanying text.
25 For further discussion on the impact of decision in Deschutes River Alliance, see infra
notes 193-210 and accompanying text.
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(Reservation).26 The Reservation is home to the Tribe and is reserved for
their exclusive use through an 1855 treaty.27 The Tribe is committed to
enhancing all Tribal natural resources.28 Resources are managed as
sustainable assets available for cultural, subsistence, economic and social
purposes in furtherance of the treaty status.29
PGE began work on the Pelton Project in 1951 after the Federal
Power Commission (FPC) authorized its construction.30 The goal of the
Pelton Project is
throughout the Deschutes River.31 Currently, the Pelton Project provides
enough emission-free hydropower to power more than 150,000 homes.32
In 1980, the successor of the FPC, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), amended the Pelton Project license to permit
construction of the Round Butte Dam (Dam) and power generation
facilities.33 In 2001, PGE and the Tribe filed competing applications for a
new license to operate facilities as part of the Project.34 They
subsequently decided to reach an agreement and entered into a Global
Settlement and Compensation Agreement (Settlement Agreement).35 The
Settlement Agreement established an Ownership and Operation
Agreement, which designates PGE as the operator of the Pelton and
facilities.36 Shortly after, PGE and the Tribe jointly applied for a new
26

Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1174 (D. Or.
2018) (identifying defendant).
27 Id. (noting Tribe is legal successor in interest of 1855 treaty). The Tribe consists of
three Indian tribal groups: the Warm Springs, the Wasco, and the Paiute. See also id.
(listing tribes involved in Pelton Project).
28 Natural Resources, CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF WARM SPRINGS, https://warmspringsnsn.gov/tribal-programs/natural-resources (last visited Oct. 11, 2021) (discussing mission
of Tribe).
29
Id. (explaining guiding principles of Tribe). The Tribe has a Fisheries Department
charged with protecting and enhancing fisheries habitat on the reservation and monitoring
natural production. The Tribe also has a Water & Soil Department that is committed to
the protecting the natural resources of water, soil, and air as to maintain a safe and
productive ecosystem.
30 Deschutes River All., 323 F. Supp. at 1174 (issuing 50-year license to PGE).
31 Our Story, PORTLAND GEN. ELEC. CO., https://portlandgeneral.com/about/rec-fish/
deschutes-river/our-story (last visited Oct. 11, 2021) (discussing purpose for
implementing Pelton Project).
32 Id. (noting impact of Pelton Project on Tribe).
33 Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2021)
(amending license to designate PGE and Tribe as joint licenses for Pelton Project).
34 Id. (explaining history of license for the Pelton Project).
35 Id. (explaining history of 2005 approval of Settlement Agreement by FERC).
36 Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1174-75 (D.
Or. 2018) (clarifying roles of PGE and Tribe).
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license and a CWA Section 401 certifica
Quality (DEQ).37
In 2005, FERC approved the Settlement Agreement and issued a new
license to PGE and the Tribe incorporating the DEQ water quality
certification.38 Notably, the Settlement Agreement included a Fish
Passage Plan to facilitate fish movement through the Pelton Project.39 In
2009, PGE installed a Selective Water Withdrawal facility (SWW) to
facilitate fish passage and improve compliance with water quality
standards.40
Shortly after the SWW began operation, the DRA formed amidst
based on
pH value, temperature, and oxygen standards.41 The group researched
and studied the changes in the river patterns.42 Their research revealed
the inattention of both tribal and municipal bodies supposedly committed
to water quality improvement.43 By the end of 2015, DRA published
numerous reports on the biological health of the Lower Deschutes
River.44 DRA attempted to negotiate with PGE, the Tribe, and other
governmental agencies, but failed to reach an agreement.45 The group
brought suit against PGE under the citizen suit provision of the CWA in
the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.46 DRA
alleged hundreds of ongoing violations of the Pelton Project's CWA
Section 401 Certification from DEQ, which is a condition of the 2005

37

Deschutes River All., 1 F.4th at 1157 (detailing joint application). PGE and the Tribe
also participated in a Settlement Working Group to address concerns about the project.
Id.
38 Id. (describing new license).
39 Id. (explaining Settlement Agreement).
40 Id. (drawing water from both surface and bottom of Lake Billy Chinook).
41 Deschutes River All., 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1175-76.
42 See McMillan, supra note 1 (discussing first step to addressing changes in Lower
Deschutes River).
43 Id. (expressing concern for future of Deschutes River).
44 Id. (discussing findings of DRA studies).
45 Id. (explaining ways to mitigate damage Pelton Project was making).
46 Id. (noting foundation of lawsuit).
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License.47 The alleged violations included failure to maintain the proper
pH levels, dissolved oxygen standards, and temperature standards.48
PGE moved to dismiss for failure to join the Tribe as a required
party.49 The district court denied the motion, acknowledging the Tribe as
a required party but finding it could not be joined to the suit due to its
50
DRA then filed an amended
complaint joining the Tribe as an additional defendant.51
On August 3, 2018, the district court granted PGE and the Tribe's
motions for summary judgment, holding the Project abided by its Section
401 certificate and did not exceed water quality standards.52 DRA
appealed, and PGE and the Tribe cross-appealed.53 The Ninth Circuit
mary judgment grant and held the CWA
does not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, leaving the question of
whether PGE violated the CWA unanswered.54
III.

STILL WATERS RUN DEEP: LEGAL BACKGROUND
SURROUNDING THE NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDING

Pollution was traditionally seen as primarily a state and local
problem.55 It was not until the mid-1900s that Congress began regulating
pollution in interstate waters.56 Since then, the laws and regulations have
47

Id. (discussing allegations made in complaint)
505(a)(1) of the CWA, codified under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). Deschutes River All. v.
Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1174 (D. Or. 2018) (citing 33 U.S.C. §
1365(a)(1)). Specifically, the DRA alleges PGE violated three conditions set by the DEQ:
Management Plan contained in the WQMMP; (2) Condition C.1, requiring that the SWW
facility be operated in accordance with the Temperature Management Plan; and (3)
Condition S, which requires that no wastes be discharged and no activities conducted that
48

Complaint at 6-8, Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 323 F. Supp. 3d
1171. 1176 (D. Or. 2018) (3:16-cv-1644-) (explaining violations).
49 Deschutes River All., 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1174-75 (D. Or. 2018) (moving to dismiss).
The Tribe, not originally designated as a party, appearing as amicus, argued in support of
the motion.
50 Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153, 1163 (9th Cir. 2021)
51

First Amended Complaint at 1-2, Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 323
F. Supp. 3d 1171 (D. Or. 2018) (3:16-cv-1644-SI) (adding Defendant).
52 Deschutes River All., 1 F.4th at 1158
53 Id.
54
Id. at 1163 (dismissing suit).
55 EPA, History of the Clean Water Act, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/historyclean-water-act (last visited Sept. 11, 2021) (discussing history of water pollution
protection).
56 Id. (providing history of water quality regulation).
51

been repeatedly amended, contributing to confusion in courts.57 Native
Americans have been living on reservation land and using the water
therein since before these laws.58 The Tribe was organized in 1937, more
than ten years before the first federal law addressing water pollution was
enacted.59 Since then, the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have
grappled with the issue of sovereign immunity, but not until now under
the CWA.60
A.

The Clean Water Act

The United States legislation addressing water pollution began with
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 (FWPCA).61 Congress
further amended the FWPCA in 1972 amid rising public concern over
water pollution.62 Following this amendment, the FWPCA became
commonly known as the CWA.63 The CWA regulates the discharge of
pollutants into the nation s waters and regulates water quality
standards.64 The CWA forbids any person from polluting waters without
obtaining a permit.65
authorize tribes to regulate water quality under the Act.66 In 1987,
however, Congress amended the statute to treat tribes as states under the
57

See id. (noting amendments to CWA).
See History, CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF WARM SPRINGS, https://warmsprings-nsn.gov/
history/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
59 Id. (adopting a constitution and bylaws).
60 See Campbell & Ginsberg, supra
first time a court has found that the CWA does not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity).
61 See History of the Clean Water Act, supra note 54 (describing history of water
pollution protection).
62
Id. (noting need for amendment). The 1921 amendments include: establishing a basic
regulation structure, giving the EPA the authority to implement pollution control
programs, maintaining existing requirements, and making it unlawful to discharge
pollutants.
63 Id. (discussing history of CWA).
64 EPA, Summary of the Clean Water Act, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/
summary-clean-water-act (last visited Sept. 12, 2021) (detailing purpose and effect of
Clean Water Act).
65 Id. (discussing history of Clean Water Act). Congress amended the CWA again in 1981
and 1987. See History of the Clean Water Act, supra note 54 (explaining amendments to
58

process. The later amendment also replaced the construction grants program with the
Clean Water State Revolving Fund to better address water quality needs.
66 EPA, Tribes and EPA: 50 Years of Environmental Partnership, https://www.epa.gov/
tribal/tribes-and-epa-50-years-environmental-partnership (last visited April, 12, 2022)
(noting history of Clean Water Act regulations).
52

CWA.67 The CWA now permits tribes to act as States for the purpose of
water quality standards programs under 33 U.S.C § 1341.68 Nevertheless,
disputes still arise over whether tribes may regulate activities of nonIndians on land owned by non-Indians, even though it is widely
69

deny, or waiv
discharging pollutants into navigable waters.70 Congress enacted Section
401 to encourage collaboration between states and federal agencies to
protect water quality.71 Under Section 401 of the CW
a federal license to engage in activity that may result in a discharge of a
pollutant must obtain a water quality certification from the relevant State
72
A Section 401 certification attests that the activity
will comply with the applicable laws, including state laws.73 Once
approved, the applicable laws become part of the certificate's
requirements, which become conditions of the federal license.74
The CWA authorizes citizen suits "against any person (including (i)
the United States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or
agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
75
A "person"
76
lity." A "municipality" is defined to
77

67

Id. (explaining when tribes became recognized under Clean Water Act).
EPA, Overview of CWA Section 401 Certification, https://www.epa.gov/cwa-401/
overview-cwa-section-401-certification (last visited April, 12 2022).
69 Paula Goodman Maccabee, Tribal Authority to Protect Water Resources and Reserved
Rights Under Clean Water Act Section 401, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 618, 622-23
(2015) (explaining a dispute about tribal abilities).
70
EPA, Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, https://www.epa.gov/cwa-401 (last visited
Sept. 12, 2021).
71 EPA, Clean Water Act Section 401 Guidance For Federal Agencies, States And
Authorized Tribes, https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2019-06/documents/cwa_
section_401_guidance. pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2021) (giving states and tribes direct
role in licensing processes).
72 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1); Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153,
1157 (9th Cir. 2021) (explaining certification process).
73 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1), (d); Deschutes River All., 1 F.4th at 1157 (noting meaning of
section 401 certificate).
74
33 U.S.C. § 1341(d); Deschutes River All., 1 F.4th at 1157 (explaining citizen suit
provision).
75 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (authorizing civil action).
76 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (defining person).
77 33 U.S.C. § 1362(4) (defining municipality).
68
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The Ninth Circuit grapples with the two step definitional chain in its
analysis.78
B.

Statutory Interpretation

In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall announced that it is
the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law
79
The Supreme Court has not developed a clear system for
interpreting statutes; however, courts often begin with the plain meaning
rule.80 The plain meaning rule instructs courts to assign the words in the
statute their plain and natural meaning.81 Courts should interpret those
words, though, in light of the full statutory text.82 The Supreme Court
83
Further, the
Supreme Court has explained that a provision that may seem ambiguous
84
When
headings, preambles, internal cross-references and definitions.85 If the
statute is still ambiguous, courts will turn to the canons of construction.86
For example, the expressio unius est exclusion alterius canon provides
the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others.87 This canon
is most helpful when items in a statute are expressed as members of a
group or series.88 This justifies the inference that items not mentioned
were excluded by choice.89

78

Deschutes River All., 1 F.4th at 1160 (discussing statutory definitions).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (establishing federal courts have power to
overturn act of Congress on grounds that it violated Constitution).
80 VALERIE C. BRANNON, C ONG. RSCH. SERV., RL45153, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
THEORIES, TOOLS, AND TRENDS 1, 19 (2018) (discussing ordinary meaning).
81 Id. at 19-20 (explaining how to use plain meaning rule to interpret statutes).
82 Id. at 23 (emphasizing importance of complete statutory context).
83 Id.
U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).
84 Id. (citing
, 484 U.S. at 371).
85
Id. at 24 (discussing where to get statutory context from).
86 Id. at 25 (discussing canons of statutory construction).
87 Id. at 54 (explaining semantic canons).
88 Id. (detailing expressio unius canon).
89 Id. at 54-55 (noting when expressio unius canon is at its strongest).
79

54

C.

Eighth Circuit Found Abrogation of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
in Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs

The Ninth Circuit dismissed the applicability of
holding in Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs.90 In Blue
Legs, individual members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe (Sioux Tribe)
brought suit against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
Sioux Tribe itself under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA).91 The members alleged garbage dumps located on their
reservation violated the RCRA because most of the sites are located in
the vicinity of houses, schools, and streams or springs and lack
supervision, fences, and sanitary trenches.92 Under the RCRA, citizens
93

Under the
94

Neither tribes nor tribal immunity are mentioned in the citizen-suit
provision, which allows the filing of suits such as the one at issue.95 The
Eighth Circuit followed the definitional chain from person to
municipality to tribe, and relied on a House Report that included
96

The Eighth Circuit held that
Congress clearly indicated its intent to abrogate tribal immunity in the
RCRA.97
D.

Tenth Circuit Found Abrogation of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
in Osage Tribal Council v. United States DOL

The Ninth Circuit distinguished Deschutes River Alliance from
Osage Tribal Council v. United States DOL, a Tenth Circuit case,
because the enforcement provision in question did not mention sovereign

90

Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1181 (D. Or.
2018) (
91 Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1095 (8th Cir. 1988)
(explaining basis of the suit).
92 Id. (detailing background of suit).
93
Id. at 1097 (permitting civil suits).
94 Id. (defining person and municipality under RCRA).
95 Id. (noting tribe is not specifically stated in the provision at issue).
96 Id. (explaining reasoning of court).
97 Id.
55

immunity.98 In Osage Tribal Council, the Osage Tribal Council
(Council) petitioned for review of an order by the Administrative Review
Board of the Department of Labor in a proceeding under the employee
protection provisions of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).99 The
dispute arose after Chris White was fired from his job as an
environmental inspector for the Council.100 His duties included filing
violation reports, which could and did trigger SDWA enforcement
actions by the regional EPA office.101 The memorandum directing his
termination referenced various specific complaints against White and
termination.102 Mr. White alleged the Council terminated him for filing
environmental violation reports an action protected by the SDWA.103 In
response, the Council argued the SDWA did not explicitly abrogate its
tribal sovereign immunity, and therefore, the Council could not be
104
subject
The Tenth Circuit
held the enforcement provision for whistleblowers in the SDWA is
105

E.

Ninth Circuit Did Not Find Abrogation of Tribal Sovereign
Immunity in Miller v. Wright

In Deschutes River Alliance, the Ninth Circuit distinguishes its own
holding in Miller v. Wright.106 In Miller, plaintiffs (an enrolled tribal
member, a retailer of cigarettes, and two purchasers) filed suit against
defendants (a Tribe and tribal officers) to challenge the taxes and fees

98

Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2021)
(discussing difference in statutory language between CWA and Safe Drinking Water
Act).
99 Osage Tribal Council v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999)
(describing basis for suit).
100 Id. at 1178 (detailing onset of litigation).
101 Id. (noting why White was deemed disloyal).
102 Id. (explaining termination).
103 Id. (alleging improper termination).
104 Id.
105 Id.
See also Deschutes River All. v. Portland
Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2021) (
treatment of sovereign immunity in the SDWA).
106 Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2021)
(explaining court only noted decisions of Eighth and Tenth Circuit and did not endorse
their holdings).
56

imposed on cigarette sales.107 The Ninth Circuit held the plaintiffs failed
to show abrogation of sovereign immunity.108 Additionally, the court
found the Tribe did not waive tribal sovereign immunity simply by
entering a contract with the State of Washington regarding cigarette
taxes.109
requirements did
not evidence a clear waiver by the Tribe of its sovereign immunity. 110
Nor did the inclusion of a mediation provision to resolve disputes
between the State and the Tribe evidence a clear and explicit waiver of
immunity.111
IV.

NINTH CIRCUIT POLLUTES THE WATERS: A NARRATIVE
ANALYSIS OF DESCHUTES WATER ALLIANCE

holding that the CWA abrogated tribal immunity.112 The Tribe and PGE
argued that the district court erred in concluding that the language of the
CWA abrogated tribal immunity and the Ninth Circuit should reverse the
113
The Ninth Circuit held that Congress did not
114
court should
The court did not discuss
115
whether the Project violates the CWA.

A.

Discussion of Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Text of Clean
Water Act

The Ninth Circuit explained that Indian tribes are protected from
suits by sovereign immunity unless Congress abrogates the immunity or
the tribe waives its own immunity. 116 First, DRA argued the Tribe
Agreement (PIA) when it agreed not to assert sovereign immunity from a

107

Miller v. Wright, 705 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing basis of suit).
Id.
109 Id. (explaining sovereign immunity existed).
110 Id. at 924 (finding no clear evidence of waiver).
111 Id. at 925 (detailing mediation provisions are not sufficient for waiver).
112 Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2021)
(describing the argument of the plaintiff).
113
Id. at 1159 (
).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1156 (dismissing case under Rule 19 without discussing violations).
116 Id. at 1159-60 (internal citation omitted) (explaining standard in sovereign immunity
cases).
108

57

suit brought by a party to the agreement.117
118

Moreover, DRA is not a party of the
PIA, and a waiver would not apply to suits by parties outside of the
agreement.119
Next, DRA argued that Congress intended to abrogate immunity in
the text of the CWA.120 The Ninth Circuit explained that Congress must
121
The court
122

Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit decided to tread lightly in absence of clear legislative
intent to respect both the principle of tribal sovereign immunity and the
authority of Congress.123
required to find abrogation.124 The court found Section 1365, the citizen
suit provision, under which the dispute arises, is the only section of the
CWA dealing with sovereign immunity and it makes no mention of
Indian tribes or tribal immunity. 125
(i) explicitly waives the United States
126
The Ninth Circuit explained if Congress
intended to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, then it would be stated in
this provision.127
Next, the Ninth Circuit argued the definitional chain is insufficient
evidence of congressional intent.128
129
Section 1362(4) defines
130

DRA argued that reference to an Indian tribe in the
definitional change is evidence of abrogation.131 The court, however,
found the mere mention of an Indian tribe not enough to exemplify a
117

Id. at 1159 (explaini
Id.
119 Id. (explaining why argument lacks merit).
120 Id. at 1159121 Id. at 1159 (explaining high standard for congressional intent).
122 Id. at 1159-60 (emphasizing standard for congressional intent).
123 Id. at 1159 (clarifying importance of respecting tribal Indian law).
124 Id. at 1159125 Id. (showing statute lacks Congressional intent to abrogate).
126 Id. (pointing out absence of clear congressional intent).
127
Id. at 1160 (discussing absence of tribal sovereign immunity in immunity provision).
128 Id. (addressing whether CWA shows clear congressional intent to abrogate immunity).
129 Id. (emphasis removed).
130 Id. (emphasis removed).
131 Id.
118

58

immunity.132 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the definitional chain but
held that it was not enough to submit Indian tribes to unconsented suit.133
Further, the court noted precedent already decided the statute does not
abrogate immunity for States, so there is no reason to conclude the
opposite for tribes.134 Thus, the court held Congress did not intend to
abrogate immunity under the CWA.135
precedent of Blue Legs, Osage Tribal Council, and Miller, none of which
the Ninth Circuit found persuasive in its analysis.136
B.

Discussion of Blue Legs

The Ninth Circuit held that in Blue Legs, the Eighth Circuit did not
reach the correct conclusion in holding that the RCRA abrogates tribal
sovereign immunity.137 The Ninth Circuit explained that it was improper
to rely on the definitional chain because the legislative history did not
indicate that Congress intended to abrogate tribal immunity by defining
Tribes as municipalities.138 The court reasoned that, even if the Eighth
Circuit reached the proper conclusion, there are differences in the
legislative history between the RCRA and the CWA.139 The court
supported this distinction
Reservations.140 The Ninth Circuit found Congress expressed no such
concern in the legislative history of the CWA.141
C.

Discussion of Osage Tribal Council

Osage Tribal Council unpersuasive.142 Unlike Blue Legs, the Ninth
132

Id. (holding definitional chain is not enough).
Id.
134 Id. (first citing Nat. Res. Def. Council v. California Dep't of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 42
(9th Cir. 1996); and then citing Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1999)).
135 Id. at 1161 (holding Congress did not intend to subject tribes to unconsented suit
under CWA).
136 Id. (dismissing holdings of Eighth and Tenth Circuits).
137 Id. (citing Subtitle D Regulated Facilities; State/Tribal Permit Program Determination
of Adequacy; and State/Tribal Implementation Rule (STIR), 61 Fed. Reg. 2584, 258
(proposed Jan. 26, 1996, by the Environmental Protection Agency)).
138
Id. at 1161-62 (noting difference in legislative histories of RCRA and CWA).
139 Id. (distinguishing CWA from RCRA).
140 Id. at 1162 (noting legislative history of RCRA).
141 Id. (exemplifying difference between CWA and RCRA).
142 Id.
133
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Circuit did not critique the result in Osage Tribal Council but instead
distinguished the case by noting the differences between the SDWA and
the CWA.143 The court found the case for abrogation under the SDWA
stronger than in the CWA.144 The Tenth Circuit emphasized the SDWA
enforcement provision language that provides redress for "[a]ny
employee who believes that he has been discharged or otherwise
discriminated against by any person."145
146

The Ninth Circuit noted the enforcement
provision of the SDWA does not mention sovereign immunity, unlike the
citizen-suit provision in the CWA.147 Because the SDWA does not have a
specific sovereign immunity provision, the Ninth Circuit concluded there
is
sovereign immunity than that in the CWA.148
D.

Discussion of Miller

The Ninth Circuit acknowledged its previous holding in Miller but
emphasized that although it distinguished Miller from Blue Legs and
Osage Tribal Council, it did not explicitly endorse those holdings. 149 The
court explained its brief reference to Blue Legs and Osage Tribal Council
was only "in passing without due consideration of the alternatives."150
Because of this, the court did not conclude Blue Legs and Osage Tribal
Council were properly decided.151
E.

Judge Bea Concurring in Judgment and Dissenting in Part

Writing separately, Judge Carlos T. Bea agreed the CWA does not
expressly abrogate tribal sovereign immunity but disagreed with the
152
Instead of using the
legislative history to decide whether the CWA abrogated tribal sovereign
143

Id. (deciding it is not necessary to comment on the correctness of Tenth Circuits
opinion).
144 Id. (comparing RCRA and CWA).
145 Id. (stating premise for suit in Osage Tribal Council).
146 Id. (exemplifying definitional chain).
147 Id. (comparing RCRA and CWA citizen suit provisions).
148 Id. (distinguishing between RCRA and CWA).
149
Id. (explaining Ninth Circuit has not endorsed holdings of Eighth and Tenth Circuits).
150 Id. (citing United States v. McAdory, 935 F.3d 838, 843 (9th Cir. 2019)).
151 Id. (discussing why Ninth Circuit is not tied to Blue Legs and Osage Tribal Council
precedent).
152 Id. at 1164 (Bea, K., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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immunity, Judge Bea argued the court should have relied on statutory
interpretation.153 Specifically, he advocated for implementing the
expression unius est exclusio alterius doctrine, which presumes when a
omissions should be understood as exclusions.154 Judge Bea emphasized
the citizen-suit provision of the CWA expressly qualified the sovereign
immunity of the United States and other governmental entities. 155 Thus,
t
the citizen-suit
provision of the CWA means that Congress did not intend to abrogate
tribal sovereign immunity.156 In other words, because Congress omitted
listing tribes in the citizen-suit provision, the provision does not affect
the t
munity.157
V.

DIVING DEEPER: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE NINTH CIRCUIT S
HOLDING IN DESCHUTES RIVER ALLIANCE

If the Ninth Circuit had considered the meaning of the CWA in light
of the entire statute and adopted the reasoning of the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits, it would likely have held the CWA does abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity and then determine whether the Pelton Project
violated the CWA.158 The first rule of statutory interpretation is to
interpret the statute according to its plain meaning absent clear
congressional intent to the contrary.159
is considered in the context of the entire statute.160 Reading the CWA as
a whole and applying the plain meaning to its terms, DRA argued the
statute is unambiguous.161 The CWA provides any citizen may bring an
162
163

defines person

153

The CWA further defines

Id. (critiquing Ninth Circuit reasoning).
Id. (discussing use of statutory interpretation).
155 Id. (discussing absence of a waiver in immunity provision).
156 Id. (explaining omission).
157 Id. (concurring in judgment).
158 See
-27, Deschutes River All. v. Portland
Gen. Elec. Co., No. 3:16-cv-1644Third Br.] (discussing Blue Legs and Osage Tribal Council); Deschutes River All., 1
F.4th at 1164 (Bea, K. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159 For a further discussion of statutory interpretation see supra note 78-88 and
accompanying text (describing statutory interpretation analysis).
160 BRANNON, supra note 79 at 54 (explaining plain meaning rule).
161 See
supra note 158, at 24 (arguing CWA is unambiguous).
162 Id.; 33 U.S.C § 1365(a)(1) (noting provision at issue).
163
supra note 158, at 24; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (defining person).
154
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164

165

The
166

Thus, the statute shows congressional intent when the statute is plainly
read as a whole.167
Case law previously relied upon by the Ninth Circuit supports this
plain language reading.168 The Ninth Circuit in Deschutes River Alliance
held its 2013 Miller decision did not find the reasoning in Blue Legs and
Osage Tribal Council persuasive because it only considered these
holdings in passing.169 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit in Miller used the
Eighth
rationale in Blue Legs when determining that sovereign
170

Additionally, the Miller court was persuaded by the Tenth
Osage Tribal Council.171 The court cited to the
definitional chain the Tenth Circuit used in Osage Tribal Council.172
Thus, the reasoning the Ninth Circuit used in Miller should have been
applied here.173
Even if the Ninth Circuit had not already adopted the reasoning used
in Blue Legs and Osage Tribal Council, the Ninth Circuit improperly
distinguished the CWA from the statutes at issue in those cases.174 First,
in Blue Legs, the Eighth Circuit relied on the exact definitional chain at
issue in Deschutes River Alliance to hold that the text of the statute
164

supra note 158, at 24; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(4) (defining

municipalities).
165

supra note 158, at 27 (emphasizing definitional chain is not too
remote).
166 See id. (finding definitional chain is sufficient to show clear congressional intent).
167 Id. at 24 (explaining statute clearly abrogates tribal immunity when read under plain
meaning rule).
168
See id. at 25-26 (relying on Blue Legs and Osage Tribal Council).
169
Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2021)
Miller does not imply correct decisions in Blue
Legs and Osage Tribal Council).
170
supra note 158, at 25 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Miller v. Wright, 705 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2013)) (quoting Krystal Energy Co. v.
Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004)) (discussing Ninth Circuit use of
Blue Legs); see also Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1095
(8th Cir. 1988) (holding statute showed Congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity).
171
supra note 158, at 25-26 (noting use of Osage Tribal Council
opinion in Miller).
172 Id. (specifying reasoning used by Ninth Circuit in Miller).
173 Id. (explaining existence of precedent).
174 Id. at 33-34 (showing holdings from Eighth and Tenth Circuit are important
precedents).
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clearly indicates congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity.175
because it held there is no indication in the legislative history of the
CWA that Congress intended to abrogate immunity.176 Yet, Judge Bea in
his concurrence explains a discussion of the legislative history in this
history is not a
proper means to interpret legislation or to distinguish statutes.177
Legislative history should not be examined unless the statutory text is
ambiguous.178 Thus, there is little distinction between the statutes at issue
in Deschutes River Alliance and Blue Legs.179 As a result, the Ninth
reasoning.180
Second, the Tenth Circuit in Osage Tribal Council relied on the
same definitional chain as in Deschutes River Alliance to hold that the
SDWA is unambiguous, establishing Congress had unequivocally
waived tribal immunity.181 The Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish the
not mention sovereign immunity. 182 The Ninth Circuit overlooked the
reasoning
een in the
the United States in the citizen suit
section) is not required.183 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit explained that
statute is unambiguous and no more is needed to show that Congress
intended to abrogate tribal immunity.184
distinguish Deschutes River Alliance from Osage Tribal Council are
therefore unpersuasive.185

175

Id. at 34 (noting similar language in statute, Deschutes River Alliance, and Blue Legs);
Blue Legs, 867 F.2d at 1095 (holding statue clearly abrogates tribal sovereign immunity).
176
Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2021)
(distinguishing legislative history in Blue Legs from Deschutes River All.).
177 Id. at 1164 (finding legislative history improper for interpretation).
178 See BRANNON, supra note 79, at 37 (discussing debate over statutory interpretation).
179 See
supra note 158, at 24 (discussing RCRA and CWA).
180 Id. at 26 (describing Blue Legs as strong support for congressional abrogation).
181 Osage Tribal Council v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 1999), 187
F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding SDWA is unambiguous); Deschutes River All.,
1 F.4th at 1161 (noting language of SDWA and CWA).
182 Deschutes River All., 1 F.4th at 1162.
183
supra note 158, at 28-29 (quoting Osage Tribal Council, 187
F.3d at 1182 (quoting Davidson v. Board of Governors, 920 F.2d 441, 443 (7th Cir.
1990))).
184 Id.
purpose in statute).
185 Id. (analyzing difference in two cases).
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Additionally, the Ninth Circuit failed to address another potential
reason why Congress included the express abrogation of the United
States immunity in the enforcement provision and did not mention
tribes.186 The district court explained Congress intended to expand the
in Section 1365(a)(1) from that used in Section
187
1362(5). Congress decided not to include a parallel statement about
Indian tribes in section 1365(a)(1) because the existing definition [of
person already expressly provided for suits against Tribes. 188 Thus,
Congress did not intend to make Section 1365(a)(1) the sole provision
dealing with immunity.189
argument is
unpersuasive because Congress did not
intend to make the citizen suit provision the only provision dealing with
immunity.190
For the foregoing reasons, the Ninth Circuit erred in finding
Congress did not unambiguously abrogate tribal immunity.191 The Ninth
Circuit improperly rejected
and found ambiguity
in the CWA where there is not any.192 Thus, the court should have
suits against tribes because the CWA shows congressional intent to
abrogate tribal immunity.193
VI.

A LARGER PROBLEM RISES TO THE SURFACE: THE IMPACT
OF DESCHUTES RIVER ALLIANCE

Deschutes River Alliance prevented
the court from addressing the alleged violations and harmful effects of
the Pelton Project.194 In an attempt to protect the Tribe from unconsented
suit, the Ninth Circuit subjected the residents on the Deschutes River,
including tribal members, to polluted waters and depleted fish passage.195
186

Id.
Id. (introducing amendment timeline as possible reason for not including tribes in
enforcement provision).
188 Id. (discussing existing definition already included tribes so there is no need to repeat
it).
189 Id. (emphasizing theory of congressional intent).
190 See id. (discussing distr
191 See generally id. (arguing Ninth Circuit should affirm district court decision).
192 See generally id. (discussing why Ninth Circuit should find CWA abrogates tribal
immunity).
193
See generally id. (holding CWA clearly abrogates tribal sovereign immunity).
194 See Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153, 1163 (9th Cir.
2021) (dismissing suit because Congress did not clearly abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity).
195 See id. (noting court did not decide whether PGE and Tribe violates CWA).
187
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Over a decade of operation, the SWW at the Pelton Project has degraded
the quality of the water flowing into the Lower Deschutes River.196 The
water is now warmer, pH levels greatly exceed water quality standards
set by the state of Oregon, and nuisance algae now blanket the
riverbed.197 The fate of the Deschutes River and its surrounding
communities might have been prevented had the Ninth Circuit
interpreted the CWA in light of the entire statutory text and applied the
precedent it set in Miller.198
The Ninth Circuit decided to take a softer approach in this case to
respect both the principle of tribal sovereign immunity and the authority
of Congress, but,
of the CWA.199 The SWW operations have imposed great financial cost
on ratepayers and substantial harm
to aquatic life. 200 Such harm is
fundamentally inconsistent with
201

fish reintroduction program has not produced consistent, sustainable
return of fish as promised.202 The Ninth Circuit may be trying to protect
the Pelton Project. More likely, the Ninth Circuit was too concerned with
infringing on tribal sovereignty and submitting the Tribe to unconsented
suit. The Ninth
to function as a broad exception to CWA application. If a CWA permit is
obtained on tribal land, the lower courts will turn a blind eye to the
d with a tribe. The
waters.203
Deschutes Water Alliance also
muddies the waters for other courts ruling on whether a statute abrogates

196

DESCHUTES RIVER ALL., POSITION STATEMENT RE. CURRENT SWW TOWER
OPERATIONS AT ROUND BUTTE DAM, available at https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
58c778d4414fb5205e205605/t/5e9df488bbc2c7572a07c4b6/1587410056962/DRA+Posit
ion+Statement+-+Short+%28pdf%29.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2021) [hereinafter
POSITION STATEMENT] (attributing changes in Deschutes River to Pelton Project).
197 Id. (detailing specific changes to Deschutes River because of Pelton Project).
198 See id. (emphasizing destruction caused by Pelton Project).
199 See id. (emphasizing harm to water and aquatic life is inconsistent with CWA); see
also Deschutes River All., 1 F.4th at 1159 (deciding to tread lightly).
200 POSITION STATEMENT, supra note 195 (detailing effect of SWW operations).
201 Id. (emphasizing clear violations of CWA); see also EPA, Summary of the Clean
Water Act, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-water-act (last visited
Sept. 12, 2021) (detailing purpose and effect of Clean Water Act).
202 POSITION STATEMENT, supra note 195 (finding efforts to improve water quality
standards by PGE were insufficient).
203 See id. (discussing effects of Pelton Project).
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tribal sovereign immunity.204
provides a hook for disagreement with the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, but
205
Because the Ninth
Circuit reasoned differently than the other two circuits with respect to
whether the statute at issue abrogated tribal sovereign immunity, it set a
different precedent than the other two circuits.206
Future courts that are not bound by the precendent of these three
circuit courts will likely need to reconcile the conflict between circuits.207
The groundbreaking opinion in Deschutes River Alliance is sure to attract
the attention of other circuits and environmental advocates
everywhere.208

204

See Deschutes River All. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 1 F.4th 1153, 1163 (9th Cir.
2021) (holding CWA does not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity); see Blue Legs v. U.S.
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding RCRA abrogates tribal
sovereign immunity); see Osage Tribal Council v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 187 F.3D 1174
(10th Cir. 1999) (holding SDWA abrogates tribal sovereign immunity).
205 Deschutes River All., 1 F.4th at 1160-61 (discussing holding in Blue Legs).
206
See id. (holding CWA does not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and reversing trial
court opinion).
207 See id. (dismissing holdings of Eighth and Tenth Circuits).
208 See id. (dismissing suit because CWA did not clearly abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity).
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